Overview:

Beijing has been looking to rein in criminal networks across all of Southeast Asia, with the campaign earning another victory in the sentencing of key members of the Bai mafia family. Two anti-crime initiatives over the last decade have brought the four families of a Chinese border city to be largely demolished. These families largely operated out of compounds in loosely governed border regions of Myanmar, where drug trafficking, illegal gambling, and scam operations all took place. There are future implications surrounding many aspects of this story, from China’s regional influence to a potential misuse of legal definitions.

Establishing and Consolidating Scam Networks

Scam networks are transnational criminal organizations operating across borders, carrying out large-scale financial and cyber crimes. At the core of these operations are scam centers — facilities where thousands of people are trafficked and coerced into conducting online financial fraud targeting victims worldwide.

These scam centers, sometimes referred to as fraud factories or scam hubs, function under brutal conditions. Workers are often held against their will, facing threats of violence and torture. In many cases, the only way out is through a ransom paid by a family member or loved one.

The Evolution of Scam Networks in Southeast Asia

1990s: Emergence of unregulated and illegal gambling rings with decentralized scam operations.

2000s: Shift toward targeting personal bank accounts and individual financial data.

2010s: Rise of long-form scam schemes such as “pig butchering” — elaborate operations that build emotional trust with victims before defrauding them.

2017–2021: Consolidation of large scam compounds. These networks increasingly relied on human trafficking, luring victims through fake job interviews and recruitment scams.

2020–2022: The Covid-19 pandemic accelerated the move to online operations. Job insecurity and prolonged lockdowns made both scammers and victims more active online, heightening the global reach and profitability of scam enterprises.

Today, the structural core of these networks remains centered in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos — nations with porous borders, weak governance, and frequent corruption. In regions like Myanmar’s Kokang Self-Administered Zone, organized crime flourished under the control of four powerful mafia families.

The recent sentencing of several Bai family members to death marks a significant moment in China’s escalating campaign to dismantle these criminal networks and send a message to others still operating in the region.

The Four Families

The Four Families of Laukkiang rose to prominence through illegal gambling, drug trafficking, and telecommunications fraud. When the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted casino revenues, they shifted heavily toward online scam operations.

Widespread unemployment during lockdowns created a steady supply of trafficked labor, while the surge in global internet activity provided a massive new market of potential victims.

This period of growth, however, was short-lived. In late 2023, China began an aggressive campaign to eliminate the Four Families’ influence.

On January 30, 2024, Myanmar extradited Bai Suocheng, Wei Chaoren, and Liu Zhengxiang to Chinese authorities. Bai Suocheng, a senior figure in the Bai family, was sentenced to death along with four relatives. The fates of Liu Zhengxiang and Wei Chaoren — leaders of the Liu and Wei families — remain unclear, while Ming Xuechang of the Ming family reportedly took his own life while still in Myanmar’s custody.

Normalization, Regional Influence, and Legal Definitions

The downfall of the Four Families was part of a broader regional crackdown on organized crime. Joint operations between China and several Southeast Asian countries — including Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar — have become routine. These efforts have led to the repatriation of more than 50,000 Chinese nationals, encompassing both scam victims and perpetrators.

China’s campaign builds on earlier efforts such as the 2018–2021 “Saohei” (扫黑除恶) initiative — translated as “Sweeping Away Black Societies and Eradicating Evil Forces.” While Saohei originally targeted a wide range of organized criminal activity, its legacy and principles carried forward through the Anti-Organized Crime Law of 2022, which institutionalized China’s anti-mafia strategies.

This legal foundation paved the way for the renewed push in 2023–2024 to capture and dismantle key figures in the Laukkiang network.

Reinvigoration and Regional Dynamics

China’s reinvigorated anti-crime pursuits also serve as tools for expanding its influence in Southeast Asia. Through a combination of infrastructure investment, diplomatic engagement, and trade partnerships, Beijing continues to strengthen regional ties — often aligning its initiatives with local elites and business interests.

Joint anti-crime operations provide not only security cooperation but also a framework for sustained political dialogue. Even as China’s popularity remains uneven, many regional governments increasingly view Beijing as a more reliable partner than Washington — though this sentiment varies by nation. For instance, Vietnam remains notably skeptical of Chinese overtures despite pragmatic collaboration.

Dismantling and the Risks Ahead

The large-scale dismantling of Laukkiang’s Four Families represents both a domestic triumph for Beijing and a regional milestone in anti-crime cooperation. Yet, this progress carries potential risks.

As China normalizes the legal and political frameworks behind its anti-crime efforts, there is a danger of mission creep — where legitimate political or social advocacy could be mislabeled as “malign” or subversive.

Terms like “malign forces” are often vaguely defined, describing entities that “threaten social and political order.” Such ambiguity allows for the selective prosecution of individuals or groups viewed as inconvenient to state interests.

While the eradication of organized crime is a clear public good, maintaining transparency and accountability will be essential to ensure that the campaign against criminality does not become a pretext for political repression or erosion of civil liberties.